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Abstract
I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁrm-speciﬁc capital the Taylor principle can generate
multiple equilibria. Sveen and Weinke (2005b) obtain that result in the con-
text of a Calvo-style sticky price model. One potential criticism is that the
price stickiness which is needed for our theoretical result to be relevant from
a practical point of view is somewhat to the high part of available empirical
estimates. In the present paper we show that if nominal wages are not fully
ﬂexible (which is an uncontroversial empirical fact) then the Taylor principle
fails already for some minor degree of price stickiness. We use our model
to explain the consequences of both nominal rigidities for the desirability of
alternative interest rate rules.
Keywords: Nominal Rigidities, Aggregate Investment, Monetary Policy.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E22, E31
∗Thanks to seminar participants at Norges Bank. Special thanks to Jess Benhabib, Øistein
Røisland, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé and Martín Uribe. The usual disclaimer applies. The views
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to Norges Bank.
†Research Department, Norges Bank (The Central Bank of Norway), e-mail:
tommy.sveen@norges-bank.no
‡Duke University, e-mail: weinkel@duke.edu
11 Introduction
According to the conventional wisdom a central bank can avoid becoming a source
of unnecessary macroeconomic ﬂuctuations by simply following the Taylor principle.
The latter prescribes to adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one
in response to changes in inﬂation. Indeed, many New-Keynesian (NK) models
imply that the Taylor principle is a suﬃcient condition for determinacy, i.e. local
uniqueness of rational expectations equilibrium (REE), a property that is, in turn,
often used to explain macroeconomic stability or lack thereof.1
Sveen and Weinke (2005b) show, however, that the Taylor principle can easily
fail to guarantee determinacy if it is taken into account that ﬁrms do not only
post prices but also make investment decisions.2 Speciﬁcally, we show that there
exists an indeterminacy region which obtains for policies that respect the Taylor
principle (in addition to the usual region which corresponds to interest rate rules
that are inconsistent with that principle). Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the empirically
plausible design of monetary policy in the US since the early eighties3 can explain the
isochronal stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes, whereas the Taylor principle
in itself cannot.
One potential criticism is as follows. The Taylor principle remains a suﬃcient
condition for determinacy in the context of our 2005b model if prices are ﬂexible
enough. Indeed, the indeterminacy problem we uncover in that paper only exists
if the average expected lifetime of a price is at least three quarters. That is not
implausible,4 but if ﬁrms were to change their prices about every 5.5 months, as
Bils and Klenow (2004) report, then the Taylor principle would be suﬃcient for
determinacy. The case for combining that principle with some responsiveness of the
1See, e.g., Taylor (1999a), Clarida et al. (2000) and Woodford (2001).
2Earlier contributions which analyze some problems with the Taylor principle include Edge and
Rudd (2002), Røisland (2003), and Galí et al. (2004). Moreover Benhabib and Eusepi (2005)
discuss the possibility of global instability which might occur even if REE is locally unique.
3See, e.g., Woodford (2003, Ch. 1) for an overview of empirical studies on interest rate rules.
4See, e.g., the empirical evidence reported in Taylor (1999b), Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004)
and Baudry and Le Bihan (2004).
2nominal interest rate to a measure of real economic activity and/or some interest rate
smoothing, the main conclusion our 2005b paper, would then be less convincing. The
ﬁrst result in the present paper addresses that criticism. We ﬁnd that the presence
of sticky nominal wages, an uncontroversial empirical fact, implies that our earlier
conclusion remains valid even in the event that prices are as ﬂexible as Bils and
Klenow (2004) suggest.5
In a nutshell the intuition is as follows. First, capital accumulation per se opens
up the possibility that the Taylor principle fails. If ﬁrms increase their investment
without any change in the economy’s fundamentals justifying that then the real
marginal cost tends to increase on impact (investment goods need to be produced),
whereas it tends to decrease by the time when the additional capital resulting from
the investment activity becomes productive. Inﬂation inherits the dynamic pattern
o ft h em a r g i n a lc o s ta n dt ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h ec e n t r a lb a n kf o l l o w st h eT a y l o r
principle the same is true for short term real rates. Thus the long term real rate
could potentially drop in the event of an investment boom and the latter could
therefore be rationalized ex post. Whether that happens or not depends on the size
of the nominal rigidities. We show that for a conventional speciﬁcation of nominal
wage stickiness the Taylor principle fails to guarantee determinacy even if prices are
as ﬂexible as Bils and Klenow (2004) report. The reason is that in the presence of
both nominal rigidities the real wage adjusts only slowly to any change in aggregate
demand.6 The second eﬀect in the determination of the long-run real interest rate,
i.e. the one stemming from the future increase in labor productivity associated with
an investment boom, becomes then dominant.
Next we consider monetary policy rules prescribing that the nominal interest rate
is adjusted in response to changes in a weighted average of price and wage inﬂation.
5Another empirically plausible feature that enlargens the set of parameter values for which
indeterminacy obtains is non-zero average inﬂation, as Hornstein and Wolman (2005) have shown
in the context of a Taylor-type sticky price model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital.
6Ball and Romer (1990), Kiley (1997) and Farmer (2000) provide early discussions of the role of
real rigidities for equilibrium determination. This concept applies to any model feature that limits
the size of adjustment of relative prices to changes in aggregate demand.
3Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) ﬁnd in the context of a NK model featuring a rich
variety of nominal and real rigidities as well as a rental market for capital that the
weights attached to price and to wage inﬂation do not matter for indeterminacy as
long as the nominal interest rate is adjusted by more than one-for-one in response to
changes in weighted average inﬂation. We conﬁrm their ﬁnding for the indeterminacy
region for which the critical value of the weighted average inﬂation coeﬃcient is
exactly one. On the other hand, for the second region which starts at values for
that coeﬃcient which are larger than one (and which is generally turned oﬀ by the
rental market assumption), we ﬁnd that the weights attached to price and to wage
inﬂation matter a lot: the size of that region decreases substantially if the weight
on wage inﬂation is increased. Our intuition is that the future increase in labor
productivity resulting from an investment boom does not directly translate into a
decrease of future real interest rates if the nominal interest rate responds to wage
inﬂa t i o na so p p o s e dt op r i c ei n ﬂation.
Finally, compared with an economic environment where only prices are sticky we
ﬁnd that responding to a measure of real economic activity becomes more eﬀective
in reducing the indeterminacy problem, whereas the opposite is true for interest rate
smoothing. The intuition relies again on the fact that sticky wages when combined
with sticky prices imply a slow adjustment of the marginal cost and hence of inﬂation
in response to any change in aggregate demand. That property implies the following.
The change in real economic activity associated with an investment boom becomes
more pronounced which increases the eﬀectiveness of an interest rate rule prescribing
to react to that. Moreover, the eﬀectiveness of reacting to past interest rates is
reduced since the initial increase is smaller. Despite these diﬀerences in the economic
mechanism we conﬁrm our earlier conclusion that empirically plausible interest rate
rules guarantee macroeconomic stability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model
structure. In Section 3 we consider the resulting linearized equilibrium conditions.
Our results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
42T h e M o d e l
We use a NK model with complete markets. Sunspot shocks are assumed to be
the only source of aggregate uncertainty. There is a continuum of households and
ac o n t i n u u mo fﬁrms. Each household (ﬁrm) is the monopolistically competitive
supplier of a diﬀerentiated type of labor (type of good) and we assume sticky wages
(sticky prices) à la Calvo (1983), i.e. each household (ﬁr m )g e t st or e o p t i m i z ei t s
wage (price) with a constant and exogenous probability. Capital accumulation is
assumed to take place at the ﬁrm level and the additional capital resulting from
an investment decision becomes productive with a one period delay. Moreover, we
follow Woodford (2003, Ch. 5, 2005) in assuming a convex capital adjustment cost
at the ﬁrm level. Since the details of the model have been discussed elsewhere7 we
turn directly to the resulting linearized equilibrium conditions.
3 Some Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
We restrict attention to a linear approximation around a zero inﬂation steady state.
In what follows variables are expressed in terms of log deviations from their steady
state values except for the nominal interest rate, it,a n di n ﬂation, πt, which denote
the level of the respective variable. The consumption Euler equation reads:
ct = Etct+1 −
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1 − ρ), (1)
where ct denotes aggregate consumption and Et is the expectational operator con-
ditional on information available trough time t. Moreover, parameter ρ is the time
discount rate and parameter σ measures the household’s relative risk aversion.
The law of motion of capital is obtained from averaging and aggregating optimal
7See, Sveen and Weinke (2005b), Woodford (2005), and Erceg et al. (2000).
5investment decisions on the part of ﬁrms. This implies:
∆kt+1 = βEt∆kt+2 +
1
 ψ
[(1 − β(1 − δ))Etmst+1 − (it − Etπt+1 − ρ)], (2)
where aggregate capital is denoted kt and mst ≡ rwt − (kt − nt) measures the
average real marginal return to capital. In the latter deﬁnition we have used the
notation rwt f o rt h ea v e r a g er e a lw a g ea n dnt for aggregate labor. The average real
marginal return to capital is measured in terms of marginal savings in labor costs
since ﬁrms are demand-constrained in our model. Moreover, parameter β denotes
the subjective discount factor, while parameter δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
Finally, parameter  ψ measures the capital adjustment cost at the ﬁrm level, as in
Woodford (2003, Ch. 5, 2005).8
Up to the ﬁrst order, aggregate production is pinned down by aggregate labor
and capital:
yt = αkt +( 1− α)nt, (3)
where parameter α denotes the capital share. The wage inﬂation equation results
from averaging and aggregating optimal wage setting decisions on the part of house-
holds, as discussed in Erceg et al. (2000). It takes the following simple form:
ωt = βEtωt+1 + λω (mrst − rwt), (4)
where ωt denotes wage inﬂation while mrst ≡ σct + ηnt measures the average mar-
ginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure. Parameter η indicates the





1+ηεN. In the latter expression parameter θw denotes
the probability that a household is not allowed to reoptimize its nominal wage in
8In related work Sveen and Weinke (2005a) have shown that the linearized equlibrium conditions
associated with a NK model featuring lumpy ﬁrm-level investment are identical to the ones implied
by the assumption of a convex capital adjustment cost at the ﬁrm level. Our results in the present
paper do therefore not appear to hinge on the convex capital adjustment cost assumption.
6any given period, while parameter εN measures the elasticity of substitution between
diﬀerent types of labor.
The price inﬂation equation takes the standard form:
πt = βEtπt+1 + λm c t, (5)
where mct ≡ rwt − (yt − nt) denotes the average real marginal cost. Parameter λ
is a function of the model’s structural parameters which is computed numerically
using the method developed in Woodford (2005). It is useful to note that the loss





θ gives the probability that a ﬁrm does not get to reoptimize its price in any given
period, while parameter ε denotes the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀeren-
tiated goods. The assumption of endogenous ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital does therefore not
imply any important change it the dynamic relationship between inﬂation and the
average real marginal cost with respect to the one that obtains in a model featuring
a constant capital stock at the ﬁrm level. That result has been obtained in Sveen
and Weinke (2004).9 In the present paper we use this observation to develop an
intuition behind our results. We will come back to that point.
The goods market clearing condition reads:
yt = ζct +
1 − ζ
δ
[kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt], (6)
where ζ ≡ 1 − δα
μ(ρ+δ) denotes the steady state consumption to output ratio. In
the latter deﬁnition we have denoted the frictionless desired markup by μ ≡ ε
ε−1.
Next we will use the model developed so far to analyze the desirability of alternative
interest rate rules.
9Our 2004 solution to the problem of solving for the equilibrium dynamics in the presence
of Calvo pricing and endogenous ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital was obtained by using a method which is
computationally less eﬃcient than the one presented in Woodford (2005). Both techniques rely,
however, on similar observations regarding the model structure, as noted by Hornstein and Wolman
(2005).
74R e s u l t s
4.1 Baseline Parameter Values
Let us start by mentioning the values which we assign to the model parameters in
most of the quantitative analysis that we are going to conduct. We set the capital
share α =0 .36. Our choice for the risk aversion parameter σ is 2. The elasticity of
substitution between goods, ε,i ss e tt o11. The rate of capital depreciation, δ,i s
assumed to be equal to 0.025 and we set  ψ =3 . These parameter values are justiﬁed
in Sveen and Weinke (2005b), Erceg et al. (2000) and the references therein. We
set the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent types of labor, εN,e q u a lt o6,a
conventional value in the empirically plausible range range between 4, as in Erceg
et al. (2000), and 21 which is the value assumed in Altig et al. (2005). Finally, our
baseline value for the Calvo wage stickiness parameter, θw,i s0.75 which implies an
average expected duration of a wage contract of one year. That is consistent with
the empirical evidence in Taylor (1999b), Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano et
al. (2005), and Levin et al. (2005). In the quantitative exercises below we assign
values from 0.35 to 0.90 to the Calvo price stickiness parameter, θ,w h i c hc o v e r st h e
range of values for which some empirical evidence can be found.
4.2 Nominal Rigidities, Firm-Speciﬁc Capital and the Tay-
lor Principle
We consider the following simple rule for monetary policy:
it = ρiit−1 +( 1− ρi){ρ + τπ [(1 − τω)πt + τωωt]+τye yt}, (7)
where parameter ρi measures the degree of interest rate smoothing, τπ denotes the
responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to a weighted average of price and wage
inﬂation, while τω indicates the relative weight attached to wage inﬂation. Finally,
8τy denotes the responsiveness to the output gap, i.e. the diﬀerence between output
and its natural level. Speciﬁcally, we follow Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) in deﬁning the
latter as the level of output that would obtain if nominal rigidities were currently
absent and expected to be absent in the future but taking as given the current
capital stock which results from past investment choices that have been made in an
economic environment with the nominal rigidities being present.10
First, we consider a simple interest rate rule prescribing that the nominal interest
rate is set as a function of only inﬂation, i.e. ρi = τω = τy =0 . The results are
shown in ﬁgure 1.
























Figure 1: Indeterminacy with wage and price stickiness and ﬁrm-speciﬁcc a p i t a l .
10An alternative deﬁnition of natural output has been proposed by Neiss and Nelson (2003).
Their deﬁnition assumes that prices are not only currently ﬂexible and expected to be ﬂexible in
the future but that they also had been ﬂexible in the past. Recently, Sveen and Weinke (2006)
have shown, however, that the welfare properties of interest rate rules do not appear to hinge upon
the particular deﬁnition of natural output that is used to construct the output gap.
9If all the remaining parameter values are held constant at their baseline values
then the Taylor principle fails to guarantee determinacy if ﬁrms adjust prices at least
every 1.65 quarters on average (θ =0 .395). Before we develop our intuition for that
result the following remark might be in order. The dimension of indeterminacy is two
for the region which corresponds to values of τπ > 1. In the absence of any additional
assumptions it is therefore impossible to compute impulse responses to sunspot
shocks for parameter values in that range, as shown in Galí (1997). The intuitions
we outline next should therefore be interpreted in the following way. They isolate the
role of capital accumulation for the determination of the marginal cost. The reason
why we focus on this economic mechanism is as follows. If the capital stock is held
constant at the ﬁrm-level then the Taylor principle is suﬃcient for determinacy. That
leads to the following question. What are the quantitatively important changes in a
NK model associated with the presence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital accumulation? First,
the demand side does not change in any important way, as discussed in Clarida et
al. (1999). Second, the only way in which ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital implies an important
change in the supply side is the determination of the real marginal cost, as opposed
to the dynamic relationship between marginal cost and inﬂation. We therefore
believe that any plausible interpretation of the results shown in ﬁgure 1 has to rely
on the particular way in which capital accumulation aﬀects the determination of the
marginal cost.
Let us now develop our intuition. An increase in investment demand has coun-
teracting eﬀects on the determination of the real marginal cost. First, the associated
additional production tends to increase the marginal cost. The reason is an increase
i nt h er e a lw a g ea sw e l la sad e c r e a s ei nl a b o rp r o d u c t i v i t y( s i n c eﬁrms’ technology
features short-run decreasing returns to scale.) Second, the resulting additional cap-
ital increases future labor productivity and therefore decreases the marginal cost.
Inﬂation inherits the dynamic pattern of the marginal cost and if the central bank
f o l l o w st h eT a y l o rp r i n c i p l et h e nt h es a m ei st r u ef o rs h o r tt e r mreal interest rates.
It is therefore possible that the second eﬀect, i.e. the future reduction in real interest
10rates, dominates the determination of the long-run real interest rate in which case
an investment boom could potentially become self-fulﬁlling. Whether or not that
happens depends on the extent to which prices and wages are sticky. First, if prices
are set in a forward-looking manner then the future expected reduction in marginal
cost associated with an investment boom aﬀects current price setting decisions. As a
r e s u l tt h ei m p a c tr e s p o n s eo fi n ﬂation and hence (under the Taylor principle) of the
short term real rate is small enough that the long term real rate drops.11 Second,
the presence of sticky nominal wages combined with sticky prices tends to dampen
the increase in the real wage when an investment boom hits the economy. Related
to that it is important to note that the future increase in labor productivity tends
to decrease future labor demand since ﬁrms are demand constrained.12 Forward-
looking wage setters take this rationally into account when deciding upon current
nominal wages. But the increase in real wages is an important driving force behind
the initial increase in the real marginal cost when an investment boom kicks in. On
the other hand, the subsequent reduction in the marginal cost is mainly driven by
the increase in labor productivity, the second component of the marginal cost. This
explains why the degree of price stickiness which causes the Taylor Principle to fail
in the context of a model featuring ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment is dramatically reduced
in the presence of sticky wages.
4.3 A Rationale for Reacting to Wage Inﬂation
Next we analyze the determinacy properties of interest rate rules prescribing that
the nominal rate is set as a function of price inﬂation and wage inﬂation. Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2005) ﬁnd that rules of this kind guarantee determinacy if the
sum of the coeﬃcients measuring the responsiveness of the nominal rate to price
11The importance of that mechanism is obscured if a rental market for capital is assumed, as
discussed in Sveen and Weinke (2005b). Even in that case forward-looking interest rate rules are
problematic, as analyzed in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005).
12Galí (1999) and Galí and Rabanal (2004) argue that the ability of sticky prices to elicit a
negative response of labor demand to a shock that increases labor productivity is exactly the
property which makes NK models appealing on empirical grounds.
11and to wage inﬂation is larger than one. In our interest rate rule this corresponds to
setting τπ > 1. They obtain that result in the context of a medium scale NK model
featuring a rich variety of nominal and real rigidities as well as a rental market
for capital. As shown in ﬁgure 2 we conﬁrm their result as far as the standard
indeterminacy region (i.e. the one for which the critical value is exactly one) is
concerned. However, as far as the second indeterminacy region is concerned, i.e.
the one that corresponds to values of the responsiveness parameter that are larger
than one, we reach a diﬀerent conclusion. For any given value of the price stickiness
parameter we ﬁnd that the indeterminacy region becomes smaller if the weight on
wage inﬂation increases.


























Figure 2: Indeterminacy when reacting to nominal wage inﬂation.
The economic reason why the relative weight attached to price and to wage
inﬂation in the interest rate rule matters for the size of the indeterminacy region is
12as follows. Assume that the coeﬃcients measuring the responsiveness of the nominal
interest rate to the weighted average of wage and price inﬂation is larger than one. If
t h ew e i g h to nw a g ei n ﬂation is large then the future reduction in labor productivity
associated with an investment boom does not directly translate into a reduction of
future real interest rates. This reduces the possibility of indeterminacy.
We have mentioned already that the empirical evidence on price stickiness does
not speak with a single voice. It is therefore interesting to note that for a value of the
price stickiness parameter equal to 0.75, which corresponds to an average expected
lifetime of a price equal to one year, there is still a non-standard indeterminacy region
even if the weight attached to wage inﬂation is set equal to one. Our intuition is
analogous to the one outlined above for the case in which the central bank reacts to
price inﬂation only. The initial eﬀect of an investment boom is an increase in labor
demand, while — in the presence of sticky prices — there is also a future reduction in
labor demand. Wage inﬂation inherits this dynamic pattern and under the assumed
monetary policy the same is true for short term real rates. Since current wage
setters take into account the future drop in labor demand the short term increase
in nominal wages might not be large enough that the long term real rate increases.
4.4 The Case for Taylor-Type Rules
In our 2005b paper we show how the indeterminacy problem can be solved if the
central bank combines the Taylor principle with some responsiveness of the nomi-
nal interest rate to a measure of real economic activity and/or some interest rate
smoothing. Here we ask to what extent that conclusion is changed in the presence
of two nominal rigidities. The results are shown in ﬁgure 3.









Indeterminacy when reacting to the output gap (τ
y = 0.05)



























Figure 3: Indeterminacy with a Taylor type rule.
Compared with an economic environment where only prices are sticky we ﬁnd
that responding to a measure of real economic activity becomes more eﬀective in
reducing the size of the indeterminacy region, whereas the opposite is true for in-
terest rate smoothing. The intuition relies again on the fact that sticky wages when
combined with sticky prices imply a slow adjustment of the real wage, hence of the
marginal cost and ultimately of inﬂation in response to any change in aggregate
demand. That property implies the following. The change in real economic activity
associated with an investment boom becomes more pronounced which increases the
eﬀectiveness of an interest rate rule prescribing to react to that. Moreover, as we
pointed out in our 2005b paper, interest rate smoothing enhances macroeconomic
stability because the initial increase in inﬂation after an investment boom will keep
being relevant for the determination of future real rates. With wage stickiness inﬂa-
14tion reacts initially by less and therefore this channel becomes less important. De-
spite these diﬀerences in the economic mechanism we conﬁrm, however, our earlier
conclusion that empirically plausible interest rate rules guarantee macroeconomic
stability. Moreover, in related work, Sveen and Weinke (2006) ﬁnd that Taylor-type
rules are also desirable from a welfare point of view.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We show that the practical relevance of the indeterminacy problem discussed in
Sveen and Weinke (2005b) is dramatically increased if sticky nominal wages are
added (realistically) to the analysis. Speciﬁcally, the Taylor principle fails to guar-
antee determinacy in our NK model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital if prices are as ﬂexible
as the lowest available empirical estimates suggest. That strengthens the case for
some responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to a measure of real economic ac-
tivity and/or some interest rate smoothing on stability grounds, as we show. This
conclusion is also supported by Hornstein and Wolman (2005) who show that the
indeterminacy problem implied by the Taylor principle becomes more severe in the
presence of non-zero average inﬂation.
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